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Ambiguity often results when concision trumps clarity
Watertight? Royalty Indemnity ruling is not
BY C. SCOTT PRYOR and JEREMY L. PRYOR
We are accustomed to hearing that
less is more; that long, verbose explica-
tions render opaque what would oth-
erwise, if more neatly written, be
translucently clear.' In all forms of
legal writing-from affidavits to zoning
regulations-Hemingway is preferred
to Faulkner.2 Concision is a virtue.'
But concision is not the chief virtue:
clarity is. And when concision is pre-
ferred to clarity, the result is nearly
always ambiguity. Ambiguous legal
writing of any type is latently prob-
lematic, but the potential for mischief
is magnified when the form of writing
is a judicial opinion.' The recent deci-
sion of the Virginia Supreme Court in
Royal Indemnity Co., v. Tyco Fire
Products' is an example of the hazard
of valuing concision over clarity.
Tyco Fire Products ("Tyco") is the
manufacturer of fire prevention equip-
ment, including valves and sprinklers.
Tyco's predecessor sold sprinkler
heads to River Run Apartments ("River
Run") in Woodbridge, Virginia, which
Tyco then shipped and River Run had
installed by June of 1997. Six years
later a fire caused substantial damage
to the apartments. As the insurer of
the apartments, Royal Indemnity
Company ("Royal") investigated the
fire and concluded that the sprinkler
heads had failed to open. Conse-
quently, Royal sued Tyco for both neg-
ligence and breach of warranty.
The Circuit Court of Prince William
County sustained pleas in bar on both
claims and Royal appealed. The
Virginia Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the negligence claim but
affirmed dismissal of the warranty
action because under Virginia Code
section 8.2-725(1) (a provision of
Virginia's codification of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC")) the statute
of limitations had expired. While its
affirmance of the dismissal was cor-
rect, ambiguities in the Court's opinion
may mislead future litigants and
courts about several provisions of the
UCC.
The opinion in Royal Indemnity rais-
es three questions under Article 2 of
the UCC: (1) Was a detailed product
description, a "technical data sheet,"
which came with the sprinkler heads,
an express warranty? (2) Was any war-
ranty created by the description dis-
placed by an express "One-Year
Warranty?" (3) Regardless of the
answers to questions 1 and 2, did this
product description amount to a war-
ranty of future performance?
1.
The description that came with the
sprinkler heads was technical and pre-
cise.6 Article 2 deems such descriptions
a form of express warranty; but unfor-
tunately, the Court failed to make a
straightforward application of its pro-
visions when it held that "the product
description cannot be said to constitute
an express warranty of future perform-
ance for an indefinite period of time."'
Does the Court mean the description
simply was not a warranty? The opin-
ion is open to such a reading: "[T]he
language amounts to a simple descrip-
tion of how the sprinkler head oper-
ates."' Yet, UCC 2-313(b) explicitly pro-
vides that such a "simple description"
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is an express warranty: "(1) Express
warranties by the seller are created as
follows: ... (b) Any description of the
goods which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express war-
ranty that the goods shall conform to
the description."' Applying Virginia
law the Fourth Circuit appropriately
concluded that "[a]ny description of
the goods, other than the seller's mere
opinion about the product, constitutes
part of the basis of the bargain and is
therefore an express warranty."0
Royal Indemnity suggests another
reason why the description might not
have been an express warranty: "There
is no evidence in the record showing
that this language became 'part of the
basis of the bargain."" The Court cor-
rectly notes that each of the predicates
for the finding of an express warranty
in UCC 2-313 (affirmation of fact or
promise, description of the goods, and
sample or model) requires that it be
"part of the basis of the bargain." The
meaning of this phrase has troubled
some courts. Some have taken it as an
expanded expression for the familiar
SUMMER 2011
requirement of "reliance."12 But in
Daughtrey v. Ashe,11 the Virginia
Supreme Court held otherwise. The
Court concluded that "the drafters of
the Uniform Commercial Code intend-
ed to modify the traditional require-
ment of buyer reliance on express war-
ranties."" Virginia buyers need only
show that the seller has made an
express warranty for it to become "part
of the basis of the bargain;" he or she
need not have known of it."
Under the Court's precedent, even
a set of national safety standards incor-
porated into a contract by a reference
of which the buyer has no knowledge
can create an express warranty."6 In
Yates v. Pitman Manufacturing, Inc., the
Court reaffirmed its holding in
Daughtrey, stating that "[ain affirma-
tion of fact is presumed to be a part of
the bargain, and any fact that would
remove such affirmation out of the
agreement requires clear affirmative
proof."" In other words, "a plaintiff is
not required to show that he relied
upon the affirmation in order to recov-
er under an express warranty claim.""
Reliance is not an element of a warran-
ty plaintiff's claim.
Together, Daughtrey and Yates make
clear that it is not the buyer who must
prove that the description was part of
the basis of the bargain; instead, the
seller must prove that it was not." Yet
in addressing the issue in Royal
Indemnity, the Court seems to suggest
that it may be open to reversing its
prior holdings. One presumes that this
was not its intent; but the failure of the
Court to fully analyze the issue creates
serious confusion and ensures future
litigation on a question that until
recently had been settled.
2.
Royal Indemnity hints at a second
reason why the Court could have con-
cluded that the detailed description of
the sprinkler heads was not a war-
ranty: it may have been displaced by
an express one-year warranty of
"free[dom] from defects in material
and workmanship."" Two sections of
Article 2 mandate that courts maintain
the independent significance of multi-
ple warranties if possible. UCC 2-
316(1) provides that "[wiords or con-
duct relevant to the creation of an
express warranty and words or con-
duct tending to negate or limit warran-
ty shall be construed wherever reason-
able as consistent with each other ...
negation or limitation is inoperative to
the extent that such construction is
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unreasonable." We can call this the
principle of "non-negation." The next
section reinforces this rule of construc-
tion: "[w]arranties whether express or
implied shall be construed as consis-
tent with each other and as cumulative
. . . ."21 An Official Comment to UCC 2-
317 makes clear the extent to which
courts should strain to maintain the
effectiveness of multiple warranties:
"[A]ll warranties are made cumulative
unless this construction of the contract
is impossible or unreasonable."2 2 This
is the principle of "cumulation."
No Virginia appellate court has
explicitly considered the impact of
UCC 2-316 or -317 on the construction
of multiple express warranties in a sin-
gle contract. The only reported
Virginia decision on these provisions
was by the federal District Court for
the Western District of Virginia, which
held that the existence of an express
warranty by description did not negate
the implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity.' This is the common application of
the principles of non-negation and
cumulation.2 4
An opinion by the Illinois
Appellate Court is the leading national
authority on the issue of conflicting
express warranties. In Heat Exchangers,
Inc. v. Aaron Friedman, Inc.,25 that court
confronted two overlapping express
warranties. One was in the buyer's
purchase order, which also served as
the contract: "Suppliers of materials . .
. guarantee all work and materials for a
period of one year . . ., and agree to cor-
rect said defects in work or material at
their own cost and expense."2 6 The sell-
er's engineering manual, which came
with all its products, contained anoth-
er: "Each [good] is warranted to be free
from defect in materials and workman-
ship ... for a period of one year. . . The
manufacturer's sole obligation under
this warranty shall be limited to furnish-
ing replacement parts .... ."27
The substance of the two war-
ranties-that the goods would be free
from defects-was consistent. The
remedies for breach of each warranty,
however, were different: correction of
defects vs. replacement of defective
parts. In short, who had to pay for the
labor in making any warranted
repairs? The Illinois court applied the
final phrase in UCC 2-316 and held
that "if one gives a warranty with an
expanded obligation and in the same
agreement attempts to give a similar
warranty with a limited obligation,
then the attempt to limit [the] warran-
ty is rendered inoperative."28 In other
words, "[t]he more extensive obliga-
tion must control."2 9 The principle of
non-negation prevails.
Perhaps for the sake of brevity, the
Virginia Supreme Court's Royal
Indemnity opinion does not set out the
substantive terms of the one-year war-
ranty. Even without knowing its con-
tents, however, we know that it was
only one year in duration. There was
no time limit on the product descrip-
tion. Following the principles of non-
negation and cumulation, the Court
should have concluded that the war-
ranty by description survived the one-
year warranty for the balance of the
statutory term. By failing to do so, the
Court has left this issue unresolved
and the opinion of an Illinois court as
the leading authority upon which
Virginia's merchants can rely.
3.
After hinting at various reasons
why Royal Indemnity's warranty claim
should fail, the Court finally affirmed
the trial court's dismissal on the
ground that the statute of limitations
had expired under UCC 2-725(1). Tyco
delivered its sprinklers to Red River
sometime in the spring of 1997. But
Royal did not bring suit for breach of
warranty until 2003-a span of six
years. Under UCC 2-752(2), the statute
of limitations on express warranties
begins to toll at the time the goods are
tendered, and expires after four years.
Only if a warranty is for future per-
formance can a plaintiff maintain a
Continued on next page
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cause of action beyond the four-year
window.' And Tyco's warranty by
description was at least clearly not a
warranty of future performance. Or so
the Court seems to have reasoned.
Unfortunately the Court did not
amplify its conclusion. It could have
pointed to the present tense of the
verbs in the description; nothing in it
pointed to what should or would hap-
pen in the future. The Court could eas-
ily have elaborated by noting that UCC
2-725(2) requires that a warranty of
future performance be explicitly so,
which this description was not. It
might have alluded to the leading trea-
tise on the UCC, which observes that
"it should be clear that this extension
of the normal warranty period does
not occur in the usual case, even
though all warranties in a sense apply
to the future performance of goods.""
Or the Court might have cited some of
the many cases construing what it
means for a warranty to extend to
"future performance" to support its
conclusion.3 2 All of these considera-
tions support the Court's ultimate
decision, but without providing any
analysis, the Court's opinion provides
only slightly more guidance than a
Magic 8 Ball.
Conclusion
A well written opinion demon-
strates brevity. But a better written
opinion privileges an analysis suffi-
cient to exclude potential misreadings.
Few opinions perfectly do both, but
the Court's opinion in Royal Indem-
nity-with its conspicuous lack of
elaboration -unfortunately manages
only the former.
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